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THREE MODELS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BENEFICIARIES
THOMAS W. MERRILL*

What has caused the affirmative action debate to become so
acrimonious? Perhaps some insight may be gained By considering three competing models of affirmative action beneficiaries
that underlie this debate: (1) the outsider group model; (2) the
interest group model; and (3) what I will call the adversity group
model.
The point of considering these understandings of affirmative
action beneficiaries is not that one is necessarily correct and the
others wrong. For present purposes I will remain agnostic about
that. Rather, the point is that in the context of the contemporary affirmative action debate, each of the three models has
some claim to plausibility, and each is invoked-either explicitly
or implicitly-by different camps in the debate. The outsider
theory is the favorite of the left, and has been championed by
the most extreme proponents of affirmative action: the critical
race theorists and feminist theorists of academia. The interest
group theory is the favorite of the right, and is invoked by the
most implacable foes of affirmative action. Finally, the adversity
group theory is the darling of centrist policy-makers and politicians, including the nine politicians who sit on the U.S. Supreme
Court. In effect, these three models of beneficiary groups serve
as rival framing devices within the ongoing debate about affirmative action. Once we uncover and examine the underlying
group models, perhaps we can better understand why the debate
has turned so nasty.'
The outsider group theory explains the circumstances of affirmative action beneficiaries in terms of a deficiency of political
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern University Law School; former
Deputy Solicitor General of the United States
1. For a fuller development of this thesis, and application to issues other than affirmative action, see Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a General Theory of Minority Groups: Outsider
Groups, Adversity Groups, and Transfer Groups,3 ANN. REV. L. & ETHICS 69 (1995).
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power. According to this perspective, these groups are powerless, or at least have less power than they ought to have in an
ideal world, and affirmative action programs are necessary to
overcome this power imbalance. The argument is a little bit
tricky, because the principal groups benefited by affirmative action in fact enjoy complete equality of political rights today: they
have equal voting rights, equal access to the ballot, full freedom
of speech, and so forth. Outsider theorists explain that this formal equality is illusory, however, for two reasons.
The first is an empirical assertion about human motivation.
According to outsider theory, dominant groups (here read
"white males") harbor a deep-seated social-psychological reluctance to share power with historically subordinate groups. The
reasons for this have to do with unspoken fears, lack of empathy,
or simply a desire to boost the status of the dominant group at
the expense of these other groups.2 This type of entrenched bias
means that outsider groups--even if they enjoy formal political
equality-cannot wheel and deal in the political process in the
same way as competing factions within the dominant group. In
effect, outsider groups, by simple reason of their "otherness,"
are subtly but systematically frozen out of the critical fulcrums of
power within the political system.
The second reason why formal political equality does not matter, according to outsider theorists, is because the realm of "the
political" is vastly greater than the sphere covered by the rules of
formal equality. Instead of focusing on what we ordinarily think
of as being political-that is, the government-outsider theorists
posit that anything and everything that has to do with the allocation of scarce resources is "political," whether it be hiring decisions, or educational admissions decisions, or decisions to lend
money. This expansion of the realm of the political, coupled
with the previously mentioned empirical assertion about the entrenched nature of bias against outsider groups, leads to the
conclusion that outsider groups continue to face pervasive exclusion from full equality in all walks of social life."

2. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperationand Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural
Remediesfor Racial and Sexual Disadvantagesin Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659 (1991); Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the
Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043.

No. 3]

Three Models ofAffirmative Action Beneficiaries

781

The logical conclusion of the outsider model (though it is not
often stated in this bald fashion) is that we ought to have universal affirmative action with respect to every important decision
involving the allocation of resources. Further, we will not know
that this political exclusion grounded in bias has been eliminated until we can see that outsider groups have achieved complete parity with dominant groups in these coveted positions.
Thus, universal quotas that bring outsider groups into parity
with dominant groups are the only answer.
The interest group model, by contrast, is the favorite of the
most vehement opponents of affirmative action. Here, the thesis
is not that affirmative action beneficiaries have too little political
power, but rather that they have so much political power that
they have been able to seize control of the state and forcibly to
transfer scarce jobs, educational placements, and other resources to themselves at the expense of the diffuse majority
(here read "white males").
Why might beneficiary groups have all this power? There are a
variety of possibilities. Maybe the very discreteness of minority
groups-the fact that they are physically distinguishable and easily can identify each other as members of the group-makes it
easier for them to organize for political action than it is for the
more diffuse mass of white males to organize in opposition.
Perhaps the crucial position of many of these beneficiary groups
in the Democratic Party, which until recently has controlled the
federal and most state legislatures, has something to do with it.
Whatever the explanation, the assumption is that affirmative action is a kind of power grab whereby various special interest
groups-the civil rights lobby or the women's lobby or whatnot-seize control of the state and use its power forcibly to
transfer resources from the diffuse majority to these influential
groups.
The interest group theory denies both of the key assumptions
of outsider group theory. First, although most interest group
theorists probably would concede that prejudice exists, they

4. For discussion of this possibility, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products
Dead?Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 685 (1991).
5. The clearest exposition of this understanding is RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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tend to regard it as a much weaker form of human motivation
than economic self interest. The incentives for economic gain
should quickly root out irrational prejudice. This should hold
true for labor markets (employers have an incentive to hire and
promote the best workers, regardless of prejudice against traditionally disfavored groups) and the market for educational opportunities (schools have an incentive to admit the best students, regardless of group affiliation).
Second, and relatedly, interest group theorists tend to reject
the assumption that all resource allocation decisions are political. Instead, they recognize a sharp distinction between the political and the nonpolitical. The political world is governed by
the threat of state coercion. Here, interest groups compete for
control of the state, which has a monopoly on the legitimate use
of force. The prize for capturing the state is the forcible transfer
of resources from poorly organized groups (including majorities) to the better organized groups (typically minorities). There
is, however, also a nonpolitical realm, governed by the principle
of voluntary consent. Here we find of course the market, but
also the sphere of private associations and family life, and various forms of organized competition ranging from sports to college admissions. In these nonpolitical realms, decisions are
made on the basis of merit, not political clout.
Needless to say, the logical implication of interest group theory, as applied to affirmative action beneficiaries, is that there
should be no affirmative action at all. Affirmation action represents the corruption of traditionally nonpolitical decisionmaking
based on merit in favor of political decisionmaking, based on
coercion and interest group capture. Outsider group theory and
interest group theory thus define two diametrically opposite attitudes toward affirmative action; the one requires its universal
extension, the other its universal abolition.
The third understanding of affirmative action beneficiaries I
will call the adversity group model. This approach defines the
circumstances of affirmative action beneficiaries in terms of
their having suffered some disproportionate loss because of dis6. See GARYBECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 35-37 (2d ed. 1971).
7. Richard Epstein, the most influential of the interest group theorists, actually adopts
a more subtle position. He would prohibit only affirmative action imposed through the
coercive power of the state. Truly voluntary affirmative action plans adopted by the private sector he would leave undisturbed. See EPSTEIN, supranote 5.
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crete events in the past for which they are not morally responsible. There are lots of examples of adversity groups all around us:
FEMA aid for victims of natural disaster, just compensation for
victims of government takings, and tort claim or insurance compensation for victims of accidents.
Affirmative action beneficiaries also can be seen through the
lens of the adversity group model. The adverse event that describes these groups can be defined in different ways. One,
which might be called the cosmic disaster theory, was popular
with the Brennan-Marshall-Blackmun wing of the Supreme
Court." This posits that the adverse event is an entire socialhistorical epoch, such as the era of slavery andJim Crow laws for
African-Americans, or the era before women's suffrage and
equal employment opportunities for women. The cosmic disaster theory posits that these past cataclysms have left cultural
legacies that continue to disadvantage certain groups; affirmative action is conceived of as a kind of rectification or evening of
the score for these past injustices. Another more centrist approach would identify the adverse event as specific acts of intentional discrimination against the group by specific bad actor institutions. 9 These identifiable adverse acts of intentional discrimination give rise to a duty on the part of the bad institution
to institute an affirmative action program on behalf of other
members of the group, as a kind of rectification or evening of
the score for the past injury. A third and very narrow approach is
that of Justice Scalia, who would limit the adverse event to specific acts of intentional discrimination by specific bad-actor institutions against specifically identified individuals, and would limit
any rectification or evening of the score through affirmative relief to those specific victims of discrimination.'0
There are obviously important distinctions between these different versions of the adversity group conception. For present
purposes, however, I am more interested in the underlying
8. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (oined byJustices White,
Marshall, and Blackmun).
9. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 610-17 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting), overrated by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111-17
(1995); id. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J. dissenting); City of Richmond v.JA. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 498-508 (1989); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term 'sAffirmativeAction Cases,100 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986).
10. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 526-28 (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment).
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common features, and how they differ from the assumptions
that underlie both the outsider group model and the interest
group model. Both the outsider model and the interest group
model depict the relationship between the beneficiary group
and the rest of society in terms of power. For outsider theory,
affirmative action is a response to majority tyranny; for interest
group theory, it is a form of minority tyranny. The adversity
group model, in contrast, invokes a consensual model of society.
Affirmative action beneficiaries are part of the same moral universe inhabited by the rest of the society; they just happen to
have suffered a disproportionate loss through no fault of their
own. Affirmative action on this understanding is an act of sympathy for our fellow citizens-a helping hand extended to get
them over a difficult hurdle no one should be asked to surmount alone.
If the choice is between the outsider group model, the interest group model, and the adversity group model, there is at least
one good thing to be said about the adversity model: this conception bodes far better to restore some modicum of civility to
the debate about affirmation action programs. As should be
clear from the foregoing discussion, the outsider model (which
is the darling of the far left in the academic world these days)
and the interest group model (the natural favorite of the right)
are polarizing models. They are based on we-they understandings of the affirmative action debate. The outsider group model
sees the minority group as the oppressed and the dominant majority as the oppressor. The interest group model sees the minority group as the grasping, rent-seeking interest group and the
majority as composed of innocent meritocrats committed to
playing by objective rules.
The adversity group model, whatever its other flaws, starts with
a premise of a single moral community and, hence, has some
prospect of producing mutual understanding and some kind of
workable compromise. It also has the virtue of underscoring the
temporary nature of affirmative action: it emphasizes that an
injury was visited upon the group in the form of past acts of intentional discrimination, and that some kind of collective response to that injury is necessary to restore the group to its
rightful status of full equality in the political community.

